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(Double Issue)

East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity

Peter Carey

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East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity

Peter Carey

Peter Carey is a Fellow and Tutor in Modern History at Trinity College, Oxford, specialising in the history of colonial Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia. He has published several studies on Java in the late 18th and early 19th centuries and has followed developments in East Timor since 1983. He served for three years (1985–88) as Executive Director of the Asian Studies Centre at St. Antony's College, Oxford, and is the founder Chair of the Cambodia Trust, an Oxford-based charity, established in 1989, which rehabilitates mine victims and other war disabled in Cambodia. Amongst his recent books are: *The British in Java, 1811–1816: A Javanese Account* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1992). *East Timor at the Crossroads, The Forging of a Nation* (London: Cassell, 1995) and (with Steve Cox) *Generations of Resistance, East Timor* (London: Cassell, 1995). He is currently working on a book on Burma/Myanmar to be published by the Macmillans—St. Antonys series under the title *Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society*.

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

EAST TIMOR

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Double Issue October and November 1996

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Peter Carey

Twenty years of Indonesian rule in East Timor have resulted in repression, brutality and the death of almost one-third of the pre-1975 population of 700,000.

In this authoritative and timely study, Dr Peter Carey, Fellow and tutor in Modern History at Trinity College, Oxford and a specialist in Indonesia, exposes the recent history of East Timor and the courageous battle of its indigenous people to retain their national identity.

Dr Carey describes the Indonesian invasion and its aftermath of death and destruction which led to an even greater determination by the Timorese resistance to win through, despite years of famine and high mortality in the resettlement camps.

The Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991 is related in detail and subsequent international concern through the UN Human Rights Commission is critically assessed. The situation in East Timor remains tense and Dr Carey believes that only statesmanship of a high order, international pressure and the courage to take unpalatable decisions will secure a more peaceful future for this troubled island republic.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia).
Apodeti	Associacão Popular Democrática Timorense (Timorese Popular Democratic Association).
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations.
BAKIN	Badan Koordinasi Intelijens Nasional (Coordinating Body for [Indonesian] National Intelligence).
CNRM	Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere (National Council of Maubere Resistance).
Falintil	Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor).
Fretilin	Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor).
Intel	Indonesian Military Intelligence, secret police.
liurai	clan chief/ruler.
maubere	'son of Timor' (from Mambai *'mau bere'* 'my brother/friend').
nurep	*nucleos de resistencia popular* (popular resistance centres).
UDT	União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union).

East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity

Peter Carey

THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Until 1975 East Timor was Portugal's most distant colony. One half of a remote island situated on the eastern flank of the Indonesian archipelago and renowned for its sandalwood, it had experienced over 450 years of Portuguese contact from the time of the first visit of the Iberian explorers in 1514 to the Indonesian invasion (and subsequent annexation as the Republic's 27th Province) on 7 December 1975. Following that invasion, it is estimated that at least 200,000 (out of a pre-1975 population of around 700,000) have died in one of the worst genocides in post-war history.

A mere 32,300 sq km in area (the same size as The Netherlands), Timor had been divided down the middle by a territorial agreement brokered by the International Court of Justice in 1914 for the convenience of the Dutch and the Portuguese. To complicate matters still further, the small enclave of Oecussi-Ambeno (site of the first Portuguese Governors' residence between 1701–69) in West Timor had also been recognised as part of Portuguese East Timor.

This seemingly arbitrary divide has some ethno-linguistic justification, however. Amongst the myriad of smaller ethnic groups, two principal populations can be discerned: the Atoni, 'the people of the dry lands', estimated at some 400,000 in 1975, who inhabit the mountains at the centre of the island and what is now West Timor, and the Belu, subsequent invaders, who arrived between 3000 and 200 BC from the west (possibly the island of Ceram in the Moluccas or South Sulawesi [Makasar], hence the origin myth of the island as a wandering crocodile from Makasar later turned to stone) and vanquished the less warlike Atoni, settling mainly in the eastern part. More racially mixed than the Atoni, the Belu have long shared Tetun as a *lingua franca*, a language now spoken by nearly all the inhabitants of East Timor. Given the Belu reputation for vigour and enterprise, particularly as traders and swidden farmers (who clear land for cultivation by the 'slash and burn' method) it is hardly surprising that the Belu and Atoni were often referred to as two 'distinct peoples' by foreign commentators.

The distinctiveness of the two peoples of Timor is thrown into even sharper relief when one considers the very different historical experiences of the two halves of the island under the Catholic Portuguese and Calvinist Dutch. East Timor, unlike Dutch-ruled West Timor (which is now mainly Protestant), experienced few deep-seated changes in traditional society: until the late 19th century, the Portuguese exercised what influence they could through the local rulers and chieftains (*liurai*). Indeed, for long periods, Portuguese authority

was represented not by crown-appointed colonial officials, but by Dominican missionaries and powerful *mestico* (part-Portuguese, part-Timorese) families, known as the 'Black Portuguese' or 'Topasses'. Thus, right up to the time of the Indonesian invasion in 1975, traditional social and political structures remained virtually intact with local level administrators (*chefes de suco; povoacão*) still drawing strength from their family and clan connections. Indonesian claims to have restored 'age-old ties of brotherhood' which 450 years of Portuguese colonialism had sundered thus have little historical or ethnic justification.

POLITICAL AWAKENING (1974–75)

The 'Carnation Revolution' of April 1974 in Portugal which toppled the Caetano regime, successor to the 40 year dictatorship of Dr Antonio Salazar (1928–68), took most people unawares, nowhere more so than in distant East Timor. The revolution ushered in two years of great political upheaval in Portugal, a country long isolated from the European mainstream, which witnessed the re-emergence of the pro-Moscow Portuguese Communist Party and a series of violent political swings which were only brought to an end by the April 1976 legislative elections and the coming to power of Mário Soares (later President of Portugal, 1986–96) and his Socialist Party. These two years were to spell disaster for distant East Timor as the left-leaning Armed Forces Movement (MFA) government in Lisbon sought to strike a deal with Jakarta which would rid them of a troublesome burden.

Appalled by the political traumas of the mid-1960s in Indonesia, in particular the bloody aftermath of the abortive 'Communist' coup of 30 September 1965, which had left nearly a million dead, the Portuguese had long warned the East Timorese of the disasters which would befall the colony should they be forced to depart. It was no secret that the people of West Timor resented Java's military overlordship. Indonesian rule thus held out the prospect not of 'decolonisation' but of 'recolonisation' under the Javanese.[1]

When political parties were finally allowed to be organised in East Timor in late April and early May 1974, it was, therefore, no surprise that the two largest—the right of centre UDT (*União Democrática Timorense*), and the more radical ASDT (*Associacão Social Democrática Timorense* [Association of Timorese Social Democrats]; post-September 1974, Fretilin)—were adamantly opposed to any notion of integration with Indonesia, the first looking for 'progressive autonomy' under the Portuguese flag, and the latter for 'the [immediate] right to independence'. Only the tiny Apodeti (*Associacão Popular Democrática Timorense*; Timorese Popular Democratic Association) party was prepared to consider a merger with Indonesia, but even then this was to be conditional on a large measure of local autonomy.

Developments in Dili were greeted with alarm in Jakarta. Political parties, free debate, the end of censorship, social democracy, independence, internationally-supervised referendums were all deeply threatening concepts for the Indonesian military. After the struggles to preserve the unitary Republic in the face of secessionist (Ambon, 1950), federalist (Sumatra, 1957–58; North Sulawesi,

1957–61) and Communist (1948, 1965–66, 1968) revolts in Java and the outer islands, what sort of precedent would an independent East Timor set, especially for the desperately underdeveloped provinces of eastern Indonesia? Would it not act as a magnet for Communist insurgency, thus jeopardising everything that had been won at the cost of so much blood in the mid-1960s?

In September 1974, these fears seemed to be confirmed when radical—Maoist-influenced—East Timorese students started returning to Dili from Lisbon, and the ASDT party took a sharp turn to the left changing its name to Fretilin (*Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente*) and embarking on a revolutionary social and economic reform programme (expropriation of large landholdings, inclusion of unused fertile land in a system of peasant co-operatives, participation of ordinary Timorese in local decision making, and adult literacy/educational policies), which owed much to the example of the successful liberation movements in Africa (eg Mozambique's Frelimo), as well as Fr Paulo Freire's rural literacy/adult education programmes in Brazil.

In the same month that ASDT was transforming itself into Fretilin, Suharto met with the Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, and received an important endorsement for his integrationist Timor policy. 'An independent Timor would be an unviable state and a potential threat to the area', Whitlam is believed to have told his Indonesian host.[2] In this fashion, Australia, the one country in the region which, at that time, might have acted as a restraining influence on Jakarta, effectively sold the pass to the Indonesian generals.

THE INDONESIAN INVASION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Build up to invasion (1975)

Assured of Australia's 'understanding' and the support of key Western countries such as the United States, concerned to protect its strategic interests (eg deepwater submarine passage through the Ombai-Wetar straits) at a time of heightened Cold War tension, and Japan, market for over 40 per cent of Indonesia's oil, the Indonesian generals laid plans for East Timor's incorporation. Initially, it was hoped that this might be finessed through an intelligence operation master-minded by the President's long-serving intelligence supremo, Ali Moertopo (1924–84). His brain-child was the so-called '*Operasi Komodo*' (Operation Komodo). It was designed to manipulate the domestic political situation in Timor in such a way that a subsequent Indonesian intervention could be presented to the world as an 'invitation' from the Timorese leaders themselves to 'restore order' and ensure East Timor's 'successful integration' in the Republic and it cultivated the UDT leadership (then in uneasy coalition with Fretilin) at the same time as denouncing Fretilin as a 'Communist' threat.

Moertopo's scheme ultimately involved plunging East Timor into civil war by encouraging a UDT coup, and precipitating a situation in which Jakarta's intervention could he given a spurious international legitimacy. Political developments in Timor itself dictated speedy action: on 17 July Constitutional Law 7/75 had been passed in Lisbon setting October 1978 as the date for the final Portuguese withdrawal following territory-wide general elections, and in

elections for local councils in July 1975—the only free elections ever held in East Timor—Fretilin candidates gained 55 per cent of the popular vote. Unless Jakarta acted quickly, it might find that Fretilin had swept the board. The UDT leaders were thus summoned to meet the top generals in the Indonesian capital, and on 11 August 1975, with the backing of the Dili Police Chief, they launched a coup designed to wrest power from the Portuguese and halt the growing popularity of Fretilin. Unfortunately, this stratagem completely backfired. Almost immediately, pro-Fretilin East Timorese troops in the Portuguese colonial army rallied to the party's support and just over a week later had begun to retake Dili. By early September, the defeated UDT remnants were beginning to pour in disarray across the Indonesian border and by 24 September it was all over—Fretilin was in control of the whole of East Timor.

These dramatic events had significant consequences for all parties in East Timor, as well as for the Portuguese and the Indonesians. The involvement of East Timorese troops on the Fretilin side was a crucial development which not only ensured the party's victory over its opponents in the civil war, but also gave it a potent military capacity for the future: the *Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste* (Falintil), Fretilin's military wing, formed on 19-20 August, could now draw on an elite corps of 2,500 professional troops, with a further 7,000 who had received military training under the Portuguese and another 10,000 who had attended courses of shorter duration. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Portugal's military forces were also equipped with the most up-to-date NATO weaponry, which now fell into Fretilin hands.

This combination of trained troops and modern equipment provided Fretilin with the military capacity to mount a highly effective resistance to the Indonesian cross-border incursions in late 1975, and later to organise a co-ordinated campaign in the highland areas of East Timor which kept the Indonesians at bay for over three years (1975–78) following their 7 December 1975 invasion. It also brought to the fore gifted military leaders within Fretilin itself, men such as Nicolau Lobato (1950–78), East Timor's second President, and José Alexandre (*alias* Xanana) Gusmão, East Timor's Nelson Mandela, who is currently serving a 20-year prison sentence in Jakarta's Cipinang jail following his capture in November 1992.

The civil war was still useful, however, for the Indonesians, especially when inconvenient questions began to be asked following their 7 December invasion. First, Jakarta could pretend that far from ending in a Fretilin victory in September, it had dragged on for months, years even. The Indonesian army, in this view, did not 'invade' East Timor in December 1975, but helped to 'liberate' it from the 'Communist yoke' by allowing Indonesian 'volunteers' to 'support' the forces of the UDT and Apodeti 'militias'. The resultant deaths—even the Indonesians admitted to a high death toll (80,000 by April 1977 according to Vice-President Adam Malik)—were thus not the responsibility of the Indonesian army, but the 'tragic consequence of the fratricidal struggle between the Timorese belligerents themselves'.[3] Second, Jakarta could claim that the Portuguese 'abandoned their responsibilities' during the civil war when the Governor, Mario Lemos Pires (in office, November 1974—December 1975)

and his entire staff evacuated Dili for the adjacent island of Ataúro, conveniently forgetting the Indonesian role in fomenting the civil war and the colony's wider destabilisation, which, from September 1975, involved a clandestine cross-border invasion by Indonesian special forces.[4]

The reluctance of respective Western governments to lodge any serious protest about this cross-border operation was graphically illustrated in mid-October 1975, when two Melbourne-based camera crews (two Australians, two Britons and a New Zealander) were massacred by Indonesian paratroops at the border town of Balibo. With only the mildest of reactions from the West (the paratroop commander, Lieutenant [now Major-General] Yunus Yosfiah, was even later invited to London to study at the prestigious Royal College of Defence Studies), Suharto correctly concluded that a full-scale invasion would not be opposed, especially after Fretilin declared East Timor's unilateral independence as the 'Democratic Republic of East Timor' on 28 November.[5]

Invasion (7 December 1975)

While most East Timorese knew that the Indonesians were plotting a major operation, few could have guessed its scale, savagery and incompetence. The attack was launched on Sunday, 7 December, exactly 34 years to the day after the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour (1941), the operation having been delayed for 24 hours so as not to embarrass American President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during their two-day official visit to Jakarta (5–6 December).

From the start, the operation was marred by poor co-ordination—it was apparently the largest amphibious operation ever attempted in Indonesia's post-independence history, and it cruelly exposed the deficiencies in the discipline, training, and equipment of Indonesia's crack units. Here was an army trained principally for domestic garrison duties and internal counter-insurgency—the crushing of small-scale federalist revolts in the outer islands, and the killing of unarmed civilians suspected of Communist sympathies in 1965–66—now being thrown into battle against a disciplined foe, one intimately acquainted with home territory and deeply imbued with the justice of the cause. As the Japanese found to their cost during the Second World War, Timor was superb guerrilla country, a death-trap for conventional armies.

Indonesian losses will never be known, but in the first four years of fighting in East Timor (1975–78), some estimate that they may have suffered 16,000 casualties, equivalent to two Indonesian divisions. The Indonesian authorities did everything possible to hide the scale of the carnage from the Indonesian public, refusing to allow wives to visit their husbands in the casualty wards of the principal military hospitals in Jakarta, and insisting publicly that the only Indonesians in East Timor were a few gallant 'volunteers' supporting the anti-Fretilin forces, a fiction sustained by removing the insignia indicating rank and unit from the uniforms of the invading troops.[6]

Some 2000 Dili inhabitants [700 of them Chinese], or nearly 8 per cent of the total population, are estimated to have died in the first days of the invasion when the Indonesian troops went on an orgy of looting and violence. Cargo

ships even came from Java to take away the contents of plundered houses and public buildings. This material plunder had its counterpart in the raiding of the bodies of women and girls: female relatives of Fretilin fighters, and members of Fretilin-affiliated women's and students' organisations were particularly at risk. Many were arrested and imprisoned, some in a section of the Hotel Tropical in the centre of Dili, where they were physically abused (a favourite Indonesian method was the use of fierce burning *krétèk* [clove cigarettes] on breasts, faces and bare flesh) and raped repeatedly by their guards. Six months after the invasion over half were pregnant. The same pattern was repeated all over Timor in the villages and towns taken over by Indonesian troops where young women and girls (some barely in their teens) were demanded to gratify their sexual lusts.[7] Twenty years on, this harassment continues, driven by the deep psychological need experienced by an insecure and violent occupation force to prove their 'potency' in the face of widespread local resistance and the fighting capacity of the male population.[8]

Abuse of power by the Indonesian military also took on more horrific forms. Torture was used from the very start, and the dreaded BAKIN (Indonesian State Intelligence Agency) interrogation rooms in the Hotel Tropical in Dili, and Hotel Flamboyan in Baucau, were always full. Starting with beatings, cigarette burnings, and sexual abuse, the torturers progressed rapidly to electric-shock treatment systematic cutting of the skin with razor blades, the crushing of limbs (the favourite Indonesian method was to force a prisoner to place a hand or foot under a chair which was then sat upon by a heavy interrogator) water immersion and the extraction of finger and toe-nails. Sometimes, these proceedings were watched by senior officers, one of whom, Colonel (later General) Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk, a graduate of the British Army Staff College at Camberley (1972–73) and now Indonesian Ambassador to India, later drew up a manual detailing techniques for the extraction of information from prisoners and precautions needed when taking photographs of torture victims.[9]

Stalemate (January 1976–September 1977)

Despite the proud boast of the Indonesian generals that they would 'breakfast in Dili, lunch in Baucau and dine in Lospalos', thus wrapping up the East Timor campaign in a single day, it took them until Christmas (ie three full weeks after the invasion) before they had complete control of Dili. Meanwhile, Portugal had requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) which adopted a resolution on 23 December (repeated by the UNSC on 22 April 1976, and in eight subsequent General Assembly resolutions between 1975 and 1982) affirming the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence and calling on Indonesia immediateiy to withdraw all its troops.[10] But although a UN Special Representative was sent to Dili to open up contacts with 'all parties' (18 January), the Indonesians prevented him from visiting the Fretilin-held areas.[11]

The UN diplomat's useless peregrinations mirrored the almost total ineffectiveness of the Security Council with regard to the Timor issue, an ineffectiveness

which guaranteed the reluctance of any of Indonesia's Western backers to bring meaningful pressure to bear on Jakarta. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the US Representative to the UN at this time, later boasted in his memoirs, the US Administration, which continued to supply Jakarta with American military equipment in defiance of Congressional laws barring the provision of US weaponry to belligerent states, had 'wished things to turn out as they did. . . . The Department of State desired that the UN prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. The task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success'.[12]

Vital though this diplomatic support and arms supplies were for the Indonesians, they could not overcome the gross incompetence of their military forces in the face of stiff Fretilin resistance. Pinned down on a narrow coastal strip around the capital, it took them over two years (January 1976–May 1978) before they could start moving against the principal Fretilin bases in the mountains. The fact that many of the Indonesian troops were not paid for weeks on end, lacked adequate food supplies, and served under commanders who were prepared to make separate ceasefire arrangements with local Fretilin units—often to further their own trade deals with the resistance (the bartering of foodstuffs for high quality Timorese coffee was especially popular)—all militated against a zealous prosecution of the war.[13]

During this time, in the zones under its control, where an estimated 450,000 Timorese civilians (two-thirds of the population) lived, the Fretilin administration continued much as it had done during its three-month interregnum following the August–September 1975 civil war. The decision was now taken to fight a protracted 'people's war', any compromise with the Indonesians being ruled out. Falintil was thus reshaped into a regular army, and small units, called 'shock brigades', were mustered to launch lightning attacks on Indonesian positions. Although arms were not in short supply following the capture of the Portuguese arsenal, gunpowder had to be manufactured locally using indigenous resources.

The welfare of ordinary Timorese—referred to by the Fretilin as the *maubere*—originally a Mambai word for 'brother' which summed up everything that was contemptible in the eyes of the town-dwelling Timorese about the ignorant and impoverished highland peasantry[14]—lay at the heart of the Party's struggle for an independent East Timor, a struggle which was aimed at emancipating the rural inhabitants of Timor from the thrall of servitude and debt-bondage to traditional chiefs, and from tribalism, supersitition and illiteracy (hence the stress on adult education). The transformation of the *maubere* into the true 'sons' and 'daughters' of Timor, citizens of an independent state, was highlighted later by an elderly Portuguese priest, Fr Leoneto do Rego, who went with Fretilin to the mountains.[15]

Fr Leoneto's presence in the Fretilin zones—albeit initially forced—underscored a significant development in the Catholic Church in East Timor: the growth of a ministry sensitive to the spiritual and national aspirations of ordinary Timorese. Throughout the colonial period, especially after the signature of the 1941 concordat between Rome and the Salazarist Government, the Catholic Church in East Timor had been an integral part of the colonial

system. For much of this period, the Church was often the sole symbol of Portuguese authority in rural areas, and it ran nearly all the colony's educational institutions (most of the Fretilin leaders, for example, were graduates of Catholic high schools, or the Catholic seminary at Daré, just outside Dili). Viewed as a foreign Church, it was alien to the majority of Timorese, who remained animists. Furthermore, the language used in the liturgy was Portuguese or Latin, not Tetun, and, at times of political crisis (eg the 1941–45 Japanese occupation or August 1975 civil war) the majority of Church personnel (very few of whom were Timorese) abandoned their parishes to seek refuge in Portugal or Australia.[16]

All this changed with the Indonesian invasion: the priests and religious who remained were not able to leave, and many went with the local populations into the hills to escape the Indonesian army. Their links with Portugal severed and influenced by the rise of Timorese nationalism, they were forced to reconstruct their Church amidst the carnage of war and foreign occupation. The Church's ministry thus became increasingly a people's ministry, one sensitive to the needs of Timorese Catholics rather than the Portuguese-speaking colonial elite, a change reflected in the decision of the Vatican to appoint a Timorese, Mgr. Martinho da Costa Lopes (in office, May 1977–May 1983), as Apostolic Administrator of the East Timor diocese on the departure of his Portuguese predecessor, and the adoption of Tetun in the liturgy rather than Indonesian, when Jakarta forbade the use of Portuguese in 1981. This last was of vital significance both for the development of a national language, and for the growth of a Timorese national Church.[17] By 1995, over 90 per cent of the East Timorese population (out of a total of 830,000, a figure which includes some 180,000 Indonesian migrants, officials and military personnel) were registered communicants, a remarkable change from the pre-1975 situation when a bare 220,000, or 30 per cent, had been believers.[18]

Encirclement and Annihilation (September 1977–March 1979)

In September 1977, the Indonesian army launched a new campaign designed to undermine Fretilin resistance by destroying its base areas, especially its food production capacity, and torching houses belonging to known Fretilin sympathisers.[19] The nearly two years of stalemate which had followed the December 1975 Indonesian invasion had proved increasingly embarrassing to Jakarta, exposing as it did the corruption and ineptitude of its armed forces, and the ineffectiveness of its civil administration in what the Indonesians now pretended was their '27th Province' (the bill integrating East Timor into the Indonesian Republic had been rushed through the rubber-stamp Indonesian Parliament on 17 July 1976 following the 'petition' to Suharto from the hastily assembled 28-member 'People's Representative Council of the Region of East Timor' meeting in the former Dili Sports Hall at the end of May 1976).[20]

Criticism of Indonesia's actions had been growing in Western Europe, Australia and the United States, fanned by reports of Indonesian atrocities which reached the West from Catholic Church sources and the Fretilin radio link with Australia's Northern Territory. The unanimous condemnation of

Indonesia at the Conference of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries in Colombo in August 1976 had also rankled since Jakarta saw itself as one of the founders of this Movement, which dated back to the 1955 Asia–Africa Conference in Bandung, and coveted its chairmanship (which it eventually got in 1991, by which time the end of the Cold War had deprived the Movement of all political meaning).[21]

For the new campaign to be a success, Jakarta had first to obtain weapons for its armed forces. Money was not a problem (the oil price bonanza of December 1973 had quadrupled Indonesia's government revenues almost overnight), but unless sophisticated weapons systems—particularly counter-insurgency aircraft—were made available from the West, the military stalemate in East Timor looked set to continue. It is here that Western responsibility for the Timor tragedy becomes most evident: the willingness of Western governments to sell Indonesia the required equipment not only sealed the fate of the pre-1979 Timorese resistance, but also ensured that this victory would be bought at the cost of maximum civilian casualties.

The United States was pivotal, for it was, at this time, Indonesia's principal arms supplier and provider of military training. Less than a month after President Jimmy Carter had taken office (January 1977), 13 OV-10F 'Bronco' counter-insurgency aircraft manufactured by the Rockwell International Corporation were delivered to Indonesia courtesy of an official US government foreign military sales credit. A low-flying, relatively slow-moving aircraft, it was capable of pinpointing resistance positions in difficult terrain and under varying climatic conditions. It also carried a payload which included napalm, chemical and biological weapons, and high-explosive (1,000 pound) bombs capable of blowing craters in rock.[22]

These aircraft—soon joined by 16 A-4E Skyhawk bombers (built by the American McDonnell-Douglas company but subsequently modified for counter-insurgency operations in Israel)—were immediately in action in the skies over East Timor. Flying from the newly converted airbase at Baucau, they made daily sorties over the Fretilin-held areas in the mountains, while naval guns pounded villages nearer the coast. With the Indonesian army in Timor now reinforced by 15 new battalions, 'search-and-destroy' operations were pushed into the interior, systematically wiping out populations suspected of Fretilin sympathies, and creating what later became known as 'dead earth' regions (regions once inhabited and cultivated before the Indonesian invasion, but now transformed into free-fire zones where Fretilin 'insurgents' could be hunted down at will).[23]

Those who tried to surrender to the Indonesians found little mercy: women and young girls were physically abused and raped (those already pregnant sometimes had their abdomens ripped open), and their menfolk killed when they tried to protect them. Many civilians fled back into the bush, preferring to die fighting in Fretilin-held areas, rather than be humiliated and gunned down like wild animals. The fate of Fretilin soldiers and their families, especially those in senior positions or 'intellectuals' with political influence (long hair was often taken as a sign of this status), was worse: some were killed by being hurled from helicopters over the open sea, others were tortured to death.[24]

For those Fretilin suspects whose lives were initially spared, the Indonesians had prepared a form of living death on the island of Ataúro, refuge of the last Portuguese Governor, now a vast prison camp. Many of the 5,000 detained here in 1982, the gulag's peak year, were families of still active members of the resistance. Packed into little plastic-sheeted shacks under the relentless sun of this virtually treeless volcanic island, their rations consisted of 900 grams of maize a month and they were forced to sell everything they had just to support themselves. Within the space of just two-and-a-half years nearly 400 died of gastro-enteritis and intestinal disorders, the young children and elderly being especially at risk.[25]

One particularly sinister Indonesian tactic was the recruitment of Timorese to fight against their fellow countrymen: two Timorese battalions (744 and 745) had been set up in 1976, and many Timorese were conscripted into the local civil defence (*Hansip; Pertahanan Sipil*) units. Apart from a few Apodeti volunteers, most had little enthusiasm for such military activities, especially when they found that they were forced to march in front of the main Indonesian formations during the encirclement campaign, and were treated as inferior beings by their Javanese officers (the racism of inner-island Indonesians was constantly resented, standing as it did in such marked contrast to the lack of racial prejudice of the former Portuguese authorities and the relaxed *mestiço* [mixed race] culture of the colonial era). Given this resentment, it is hardly surprising that the Timorese *Hansip* units, in particular, often proved unreliable for the Indonesians.[26]

As the Indonesian noose tightened around Fretilin at the end of 1977, and more and more food-producing areas came under attack from the air, so tensions in the resistance leadership mounted. Xavier do Amaral, the 40-year-old Jesuit-educated Fretilin President, who had argued for compromise with the Indonesians in order to save civilian lives, attempted a coup, was arrested (7 September), and a year later (30 August 1978) fell into Indonesian hands. His place was taken by Nicolau Lobato, whose qualities of leadership and military prowess had already been amply demonstrated in the fighting against the Indonesians since 1975.[27]

Time was now running out for organised Fretilin resistance in the two remaining redoubt areas of Mount Matebian in the east and the Natarbora plain near the south coast. Rising to over 9,000 feet, its sides clad in dense forests riven with limestone clefts and gorges, Matebian—'Soul Mountain' in Tetun—has a particular place in Timorese folklore. Revered as the abode of the departed souls of the Timorese (Belu) ancestors, it has been a place of sanctuary since pre-history. In times of trouble, villagers from a wide area would take refuge there in the belief that the thick sandalwood stands would make them invisible to their pursuers, while the abundance of grubs, insects, edible roots, and leaves would assure them food. It was here, in the closing months of 1978, that the final act of Fretilin's first period of resistance to the Indonesians was played out as both they, and the civilian populations under their charge, came under sustained aerial bombardment.[28]

While this tragedy was unfolding, the Fretilin leader, Nicolau Lobato was being pursued relentlessly by Indonesian helicopter-borne special forces (his

hideouts having been revealed under interrogation by the captured Xavier do Amaral). Eventually, on 31 December, he was cornered on Mount Maubisse in the hills 50 km south of Dili. After a six-hour gun-battle, which commenced just before dawn, he was captured and killed by units of Timorese Battalion 744 led by the aforementioned Yunus Yosfiah and troops under the command of Suharto's future son-in-law, Lieutenant (now Brigadier-General) Prabowo Djojohadikusmo. It seemed as though the war in East Timor had been won.

FAMINE, RESETTLEMENT AND THE REBIRTH OF THE TIMORESE RESISTANCE (1979–1988)

'If Indonesia thinks that by exterminating Falintil the war will end, they are wrong!' These words, spoken by José Alexandre (Xanana) Gusmão, Lobato's successor as the leader of the Timorese national resistance, to the Australian lawyer, Robert Domm, in September 1990, encapsulated Indonesia's problem.[29] They might have destroyed Falintil's capacity to fight as a conventional army, but they had not blunted the Timorese will to survive as an independent nation. *'Pátria ou Morte!'* ('Fatherland or Death!') remained the cry in every heart. The more terrible the repression, the more determined were the Timorese to win through.

Seen from the dark days of January 1979, that determination might have seemed futile. After all, the Indonesians were mopping up the remaining resistance in the Matebian redoubt, and the surviving civilian populations in the highland areas (250–350,000) were being herded down into resettlement camps where many were to die of starvation in the ensuing months—the scorched earth tactics of the Indonesians and displacement of highland communities having had a devastating effect on local food supplies. A whole way of life—that of the shifting 'slash-and-burn' (swidden) cultivators of the mountain regions with their small scattered hamlets (povoacão) was now being destroyed in the interests of the Indonesian tactic of 'separating the people from the terrorists'.

The number of civilian deaths during the 1979 famine will never be known exactly. Some estimates indicate that the death rate in the resettlement camps was in the region of 2,500 a month (ie 1 per cent of the total camp population) throughout most of 1979, a situation exacerbated by the delays imposed by the Indonesian authorities in allowing vital food assistance to reach East Timor from the West. Observers spoke of conditions as bad as Biafra and Cambodia.[30]

The famine, which continued in some places right through into the 1981–82 planting season, when the drafting of the population into the infamous 'fence of legs' (*Operasi Keamanan*) operation to flush out remaining Fretilin fighters in rural areas again put pressure on food supplies, was a direct result of Indonesian wartime tactics and subsequent resettlement policy. So much livestock (particularly buffalo and cattle) had been killed during the 'encirclement and annihilation' campaign, that fields could not be prepared for planting nor organic fertiliser obtained.[31] The Indonesian Government later compounded this problem by awarding thousands of hectares of 'underutilised' ricefields, especially in the Maliana plain area close to the Indonesian border, to

Balinese and Javanese 'transmigrants', without any compensation to the original owners (who were now either dead or languishing in resettlement camps).[32]

In the late 1970s, the Indonesians began to conduct a detailed census of the population. Their first, in June 1979, purported to show that there were just over half a million people (516,517) living in the province, a figure which had supposedly risen to 567,000 in 1981. It is not known whether these figures also included the large number of Indonesian civilians in the territory, but it is significant that the statistics produced by the Timorese Catholic Church at this time (1981) show a very much smaller surviving East Timorese population of some 425,000. Prior to the Indonesian invasion, there had been just under 700,000 people living in the territory, and the population was growing at around 2 per cent a year. Even if it is assumed that this rate of natural growth was halved due to the intensity of the conflict and the subsequent famine, there should still have been around 732,000 people in the province by 1981. Where had the missing 308,000 (170,000, if we believe the Indonesian statistics) got to? Since only a modest number of Timorese refugees (perhaps 4,000) had made it to the West (Australia and Portugal) by this time, the only conclusion is that they were dead. This means that, since their December 1975 invasion, the Indonesians were directly responsible for the deaths of between a quarter and a third of the local population, one of the worst levels of mortality of any society in post-war history.[33]

While the Indonesians were assessing the demographic consequences of their East Timor conquest, and the surviving Timorese population were struggling for survival in the resettlement camps, the Fretilin leadership was coming to terms with the crippling losses it had sustained during the 1977–79 period. At its National Conference in March 1981, the first after the fall of Mount Matebian, they noted the following: 85 per cent of the members of the Supreme Command killed (only two [Mau'Hunu, Xanana Gusmão] of the Fretilin Central Committee who remained in East Timor after 7 December 1975 had survived and these were both subsequently captured by the Indonesians); 80 per cent of Falintil troops lost, together with 90 per cent of their weapons; all Fretilin support bases destroyed and Indonesian troops in control of the surviving population; all lines of communication between the remaining resistance fighters—outside the eastern zone—severed, and communications with the outside world cut making it impossible to channel information to supporters overseas.[34]

The first task of the Fretilin leadership was to restore links between the scattered Falintil units still capable of mounting attacks on Indonesian positions. Once these had been established, pre-1979 military and political strategies were completely revised: the policy of maintaining fixed bases was abandoned—Falintil units were now to function as highly mobile columns, continually moving from place to place. At the same time, a network of clandestine organisations was set up behind enemy lines in the resettlement camps and population centres under Indonesian control. The vital links between the armed resistance movement in the bush and the clandestine organisations in the camps and towns was henceforth maintained through the *nurep* (*'nucleos*

de resistência popular' or 'popular resistance centres') which had a presence in most inhabited areas.[35]

The new strategy, adopted at the 1981 Conference, was remarkably successful: by March 1983, on the initiative of local Indonesian commanders a whole series of local ceasefires had been arranged, which later resulted in a general ceasefire (23 March–8 August 1983). The fact that Fretilin had been able to make such a comeback from near total defeat within the space of three short years was a measure both of Xanana's exceptional political skills, and the continued support of the local Timorese population for the resistance cause.

Just how astute a politician Xanana (born 1947) actually is can be seen in his capacity to rethink the whole direction of the resistance struggle in the aftermath of the 1978–79 disasters. He realised that it was no longer enough to see the struggle as synonymous with Fretilin, and backed the idea of forming a new 'Revolutionary Council of National Resistance' (*Conselho Revolucionária de Resistencia Nacional* or CRRN), as the supreme body of the resistance, at the March 1981 conference. It was designed as an umbrella organisation for all the various nationalist groups fighting for Timorese independence, both inside and outside Timor. Xanana knew that if it was seen as a purely Fretilin front, the others would not join. So he announced that although he would continue as Commander-in-Chief of Falintil, he would no longer remain a member of Fretilin (he even returned his party card), thus allowing him to stand above party politics.[36] By now Fretilin had dropped its leftist stance and publicly accepted the need for a multi-party system, allowing it to approach its erstwhile coalition partner, the right of centre UDT. In March 1986, the formation of a new nationalist 'convergence' between the two parties, was announced in Lisbon with the CRRN becoming the 'National Council for Maubere Resistance' (*Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere* or CNRM) under Xanana's presidency. At the same time, Falintil, the former Fretilin army, was transformed into the national army of East Timor. A genuine national front had now come into being which embraced all political parties and groups dedicated to securing national independence, including the widely based Timorese Students' National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Estudantil de Timor Leste* or Renetil).[37]

The importance of this last organisation can be seen in the development of a student-led (and mainly urban based) resistance movement—a form of Timorese *'intifada'*—during the 1980s, which co-ordinated civil resistance to the Indonesians in the main towns and helped to run the CNRM Clandestine Civilian Resistance Front (estimated by the Indonesian army as having an Indonesia-wide strength of 3,000 in July 1995[38]). Their contribution was immediately recognised by the Falintil leaders in the mountains. Xanana, for example, spoke of the 'great significance' of the younger generation for the future of the nationalist struggle in Timor, and explained how even secondary school children (from Class Three upwards) were participating in clandestine organisations.[39]

Despite the enormous risks there has always been a large reserve of young men waiting to go to the mountains if called on. Numbers of fighters (200 according to recent Indonesian military sources[40] were restricted not by want of recruits, but by the limits of the resources available. Even for the network of Timorese civilians who sustained them in their day-to-day operations, there

were constant dangers. Anyone, young or old, suspected of having contacts with the resistance or denounced by the unbiquitous spy (*bufo*) network, were subjected to beatings and torture. Indeed, Indonesian soldiers and police were rewarded when a person confessed to such links. For ordinary Timorese the cost was thus very high. Today (1996), black-hooded death squads linked to the military, known as *ninja*, terrorise the local population, kidnapping suspects and torturing them to death.

The willingness of so many young Timorese to come up into the mountains to take the place of fallen comrades is testimony to the failure of the Indonesians to win over the successor generation in Timor to the idea of 'integration'. Indeed, the very word *'integrasi'* has become synonymous for most Timorese with Indonesian colonialism and its persecution of Timorese culture and society. After the genocide of the late 1970s, had come the 'ethnocide' of the 1980s, when Timor was subjected to a more subtle death, not physical this time (although arbitrary executions and massacres continued), but spiritual, the destruction of Timor's specific cultural heritage derived from its pre-colonial past and its four-and-a-half centuries of Portuguese contact. It was this loss which Bishop Belo was later to refer to in his letter of 6 February 1989 to the UN Secretary-General calling for a UN-supervised referendum in the territory and warning that the Timorese were 'dying as a people and as a nation'.[41]

As we have seen, a key aspect of both the student *'intifada'* and the armed resistance was their link with the Timorese Catholic Church, which provided an essential moral dimension to the nationalist struggle. The role of Mgr. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo (born 1948), the Bishop of East Timor (in office as Apostolic Administrator, 1983–88; as Bishop, 1988 to present), has been essential here. From the mid-1980s, he has constantly argued for a political and diplomatic solution in East Timor, including 'the respect for the right of a people for self determination'.[42] His courage in the face of numerous threats, including two attempted assassinations (in 1989 and 1991) have been an inspiration for many Timorese, and a living affirmation of the solidarity between Church and people. Twice nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize (1995, 1996), Belo, like Xanana, is essential to any long-term settlement in East Timor.[43]

Another aspect of this solidarity has been the way in which the Church has cared for the wives, widows, children and orphans of the Timorese resistance fighters. This has been done principally through the institution of the *colégios*, Catholic centres consisting of a parish church, a convent for priests, lay brothers and nuns, a boarding school for boys or girls, and a large tract of agricultural land, usually partly rented out to local farmers and partly cultivated by the students themselves to grow food for their school kitchen.[44] This network of *colégios* and Church centres caring for the families of resistance fighters, has also played a role in keeping alive a knowledge of Portuguese language and customs at a time when only Indonesian (*Bahasa Indonesia*) and the Javanese-influenced national culture is taught in the Indonesian-run schools.[45] The result is that today (1996) Portuguese, previously the language of oppression in the colonial era, has acquired a special value, alongside Tetun, as a vehicle of clandestine communication amongst the Timorese resistance. This is something

which the Portuguese themselves are now assisting following the launch of their Asiasat 2 satellite in November 1995 and their inauguration of Portuguese-language broadcasts to Asia.[46]

THE 'OPENING' OF EAST TIMOR AND THE BACKGROUND TO THE SANTA CRUZ MASSACRE (1989–1991)

Surveying the developments in East Timor during the 1980s, the Indonesian authorities may have begun to feel that the worst was over—the trauma of the encirclement and annihilation campaign of the late 1970s had led to the destruction of Falintil as a conventional army. True, there was still guerrilla resistance, particularly in the seven most easterly districts of the island between Baucau, Viqueque and Lospalos, but this seemed to be containable through the adoption of increasingly sophisticated counter-insurgency tactics and the rapid 'Timorisation' (ie use of locally raised troops) of the war. The size of this armed resistance remained small, and, by their own admission, incapable of winning striking victories. It also seemed that the massive resettlement of the highland populations after the fall of Mt. Matebian in December 1978 had broken the back of the civilian support for the guerrillas.

Internationally, pressures on Indonesia had steadily lessened in the 1980s. The last General Assembly debate on East Timor (which had resulted in a narrow vote [50–46] against Indonesia) had taken place in 1982. The following year, on Norway's initiative, further debates had been postponed to allow space for the UN Secretary-General to 'use his good offices' to bring the ongoing talks between Portugal, Fretilin and Indonesia to a successful conclusion. This was the time of the general ceasefire (March–August 1983) between Fretilin and the local Indonesian commander in East Timor, and it seemed that substantive progress might at last be able to be made towards a political solution of the Timor problem. True, Portugal was pressing the issue with more vigour than hitherto (its admission to full EC [now EU] membership in January 1985 having greatly enhanced Lisbon's influence over Western European diplomacy towards Indonesia on the Timor issue), but, even here, the larger European states, especially Britain (which overtook the US as the largest arms supplier to Indonesia in 1993, mainly due to the supply of Hawk ground-attack/trainer aircraft) and West Germany, were reluctant to jeopardise their burgeoning economic links with Jakarta.

Support from Indonesia's key trade partners—Japan and the United States—also remained solid, and Australia even accorded *de jure* recognition to Indonesia's annexation in December 1978, the only Western country to take this extraordinary step—the temptation of the oil wealth in the 'Timor Gap' between the former Portuguese colony and Australia, supposedly one of the 25 largest oil fields in the world (an estimated 5bn barrels—three times Australia's current reserves) proved crucial here. This eventually resulted in the 11 December 1989 'Timor Gap Treaty' dividing the area between Indonesia and Australia into different exploitation zones, a treaty whose legality was challenged by Portugal in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague and a judgment made on 30 June 1995. Although this challenge failed on a

technicality (the judges agreed that, since Indonesia, a key party, did not accept the court's jurisdiction in matters related to East Timor, it was impossible to make a ruling), the court nevertheless made a clear statement on an essential point: the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination.[47]

With Indonesia now taking a more aggressive stance in international forums and Portugal rediscovering its principles, the UN-brokered talks between Indonesia and Portugal made little headway. The only decision of substance was the agreement to allow a Portuguese Parliamentary delegation to visit East Timor to make a report on the situation to the government in Lisbon with an eye to shaping a final political settlement. Although this decision was reached in principle in 1988, nearly three years were to elapse before the practical arrangements for such a visit could be worked out. Its cancellation at the 11th hour in early November 1991 was to lead directly to the tragedy of the 12 November Santa Cruz massacre.

In mid-June 1988, when East Timor's Governor, Mário Viegas Carrascalão (in office, September 1982–September 1992), asked President Suharto to 'open' East Timor and allow it to be treated like any other Indonesian province, the shadow of Santa Cruz still lay far in the future. One immediate consequence of the 'opening', however, was the rapid influx of newcomers from Sulawesi, the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), and inner-island Indonesia (Java, Bali and Madura), into East Timor. Carrascalão had partly foreseen this, but he had expected that the benefits of allowing the Timorese population to travel freely both within the territory and outside (previously all such movement had required special security clearance), and the inflow of private investment—with its potential for local job creation—would counterbalance the negative effects of unrestricted migration. He was wrong. Because of fears about the security situation and the existence of powerful military-linked commercial monopolies, private investors were reluctant to put their money into Timor. In the three years following the 'opening' slightly over US$1m was pledged (for the development of fisheries, seaweed processing, and travel agencies), which was about what the Indonesian government was supposed to have been spending a day on the war in the mid-1980s.[48]

The economic realities in East Timor—especially the Indonesian army monopolies (eg of coffee sales, which local producers were forced to sell at less than a third of world prices—US$0·67 instead of US$2·10–2·20 per kg[49]—were, however, camouflaged by the showy conceit of 'development' (*pembangunan*). 'We have done more for East Timor in 20 years than the Portuguese did in four-and-a-half centuries' has been the refrain of Indonesian officials charged with defending their country's record in the former Portuguese colony. Even the army got in on the act, involving its soldiers in local development schemes under the much trumpeted *'moris diak'* or *Operasi Teritorial* (*Opster*) (territorial operation) programme.[50]

At first glance, the achievements look impressive. Between 1976 and 1992, Indonesia spent somewhere in the region of US$750m (around US$1,000 for every man, woman and child currently living in East Timor) on development projects, with particularly large sums going to infrastructure and administrative facilities. By 1991, the pitiful 30 km of asphalt road left by the Portuguese had

been increased over tenfold (with a further 2,000 km of gravel and dirt highway), and numbers enrolled in secondary education expanded 50 times (to over 50,000), with a dramatic fall in illiteracy rates (from 90 per cent in 1972 to 52 per cent in 1990).[51] No visitor could fail to notice the rows of gleaming new provincial government buildings, quarters for the burgeoning Indonesian civil service; nor the corrugated iron roofs of the ubiquitous military barracks, from whence the 17,000-strong Indonesian garrison maintained their guard on the troubled territory.

On deeper inspection, however, much of this 'development' had more to do with the security requirements of the army and the demands of the local administration, than with the needs of the local Timorese population. During the period of the Indonesian Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1983–1989), for example, transport (road building) and local government expenses absorbed close on 50 per cent of the US$270m spent in the province, with health, education and culture—supposedly top priorities in the Plan—accounting for less than 7 per cent. Even agriculture, the sector which employed the vast bulk (83 per cent) of the Timorese work force, received less than 10 per cent.[52] It was perhaps no surprise that the best roads had been built in the eastern part of the country, where fighting was still taking place, whereas those in the more peaceful western districts were again in a deplorable state by the early 1990s.[53]

The quality of the education and health care provided for the Timorese also left much to be desired. Indonesian teachers and doctors, most of them recently qualified, were poorly motivated and regarded Timor as a hardship post. The ratio between teachers and students at the secondary level was the worst in the whole country, and the number of inhabitants without adequate reading and writing skills was still nearly four times the Indonesian national average by 1990. At the same time, the best hospitals were reserved for the military or for Indonesian civil servants, Timorese having to make do with poorly equipped civilian facilities or 'people's health centres' (*Puskesmas*) where the exigencies of the government family planning programme, especially the extensive use of the controversial drug Depo-Provera (an injectable contraceptive given to over 65 per cent of all Timorese women 'acceptors' in 1990/91), eclipsed the treatment of major diseases such as malaria, TB (estimated to affect 80 per cent of the East Timorese population) and dengue fever.[54]

The most disappointing feature of the whole Indonesian development programme for the Timorese was undoubtedly its failure to create new jobs for the burgeoning local workforce. This was compounded by the arrival of thousands of 'newcomers' from Indonesia proper, who, by 1996, made up nearly a fifth of the 830,000-strong population, and appeared to be privileged over the indigenous population in terms of job opportunities. In particular, Jakarta's transmigration programme, which brought hundreds of Balinese and Javanese farmers to sites near the Indonesian border and spurred a rush of 'spontaneous' transmigrants from Atambua in West Timor, created major environmental problems. The generation of land disputes was particularly worrying here: unlike transmigration sites elsewhere in Indonesia (South Sumatra, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya), where new agricultural land had been painstakingly carved out of primary jungle, savannah, and marshlands, the

ricefields made available on the Maliana plain had been 'acquired' from the local owners without so much as a cent in compensation. At the same time, takeover by the army-dominated PT Batara Indra conglomerate of large estates (*fazenda*), previously owned by rich *mestiço* families or the Portuguese, greatly increased the problems of absentee landownership, environmental degradation (destruction of sandalwood forests), and conflicts with local Timorese farmers.[55]

An Indonesian government-sponsored study of the 'impact of integration' published in 1990 spoke ominously of the deep divisions which had opened up in Timorese society and warned of the danger of social unrest. The deepest of these cleavages undoubtedly affected East Timorese youth, particularly the 50,000 secondary school students, and those 1,000 or more who had studied at the territory's two technical colleges (Dili and Fatumaca) or had been to universities in inner Indonesia since the mid-1980s. Their resentment at the non-Timorese newcomers—the so-called 'Battalion 702' (the numbers referring to their leaving for work early in the morning [7], not bringing any benefit to the local economy [0], and then going home in the afternoon [2]), was particularly intense. The Makasarese and Buginese from South Sulawesi, who had by the early 1990s begun to engross nearly all the retail trade in Dili and other important towns, were viewed as especially extortionate. 'What's the good of school if there's no way of getting a decent job?; one Timorese secondary school student from Gleno put it. 'These days [1990] all office jobs are closed to us. If the Regional Office Head [*Kakanwil*] in a [local government] department is a newcomer, he will only be interested in having his relatives, or at least people in the same region as him, working in his office.'[56]

Throughout the late 1980s, the number of East Timorese job seekers unable to be absorbed into a workforce now dominated by 'newcomers' continued to rise. Whereas 21 per cent had got jobs in 1983, by 1987, only 3·4 per cent of the estimated 4,707 job seekers found paid employment. The total number of new employment opportunities created by the whole of the Indonesian Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1983–89) was a pitiful 1,675, just under 4 per cent of what would have been necessary to find jobs for all school leavers during that period.[57] Neither private companies nor local government were able to absorb this new generation of bright and educated young Timorese. Indeed, the fact that the monopolistic practices of the military-dominated companies had effectively 'closed off' whole sectors of the modern economy to East Timorese school leavers and graduates led them to question the relevance of educational institutions for their future. At the same time, their mastery of Indonesian, had given them access to a world beyond Timor and even Indonesia.

Of particular importance here were the contacts which had begun to be forged between East Timorese students in Indonesian universities and Indonesian academics and members of non-governmental organisations, who were themselves now starting to assess the limits of Indonesian nationalism. Some even argued for a proper referendum on East Timor's political future. These debates, however, as yet found little resonance in government and Indonesian army

circles, where belief in the rectitude of Indonesia's East Timor policy still ruled supreme.

THE SANTA CRUZ MASSACRE (12 NOVEMBER 1991) AND ITS AFTERMATH

Long before the 12 November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, there had been abundant evidence that the situation in East Timor was heading for a showdown between the Indonesian military and the student-led Timorese *intifada*. Already, in the first year of the territory's 'opening', public demonstrations against integration had taken place at the time of Pope John Paul II's visit on 12 October 1989, and during US Ambassador John Monjo's brief stay in Dili on 17 January 1990, with many young people being arrested and subjected to periods of torture and imprisonment.[58]

Important though these demonstrations were in signalling the coming of age of a new resistance generation in Timor, it was the news that the long-awaited Portuguese parliamentary delegation would at last visit the territory in November 1991, which concentrated minds in the latter part of that year. Quite unrealistic expectations were attached to this visit on both the Indonesian and Timorese sides. With such pent-up emotions ready to burst forth, Dili awaited confirmation of the delegation's arrival. It never came—Jakarta's objections to the inclusion of a Lisbon-based Australian journalist in the accompanying Portuguese press group proved unacceptable to Lisbon. So, in late October, the visit was cancelled.

In Timor, the effect was electric. So much store had been set by this visit and so many preparations made (old Portuguese flags searched out, Fretilin banners and ensigns sewn, and posters designed—in Portuguese and English—proclaiming East Timor's inalienable right to self-determination) that a cancellation of the planned demonstrations was unthinkable. There had already been violent clashes between the Indonesian security forces and the student activists, which had resulted in the deaths of a young East Timorese, Sebastião Gomes, and a member of a *ninja* (masked killer) unit. This sparked a huge protest, in which nearly half the population of Dili took part. Then came the news of the cancellation.

On 12 November 1991, hundreds of young East Timorese men and women gathered to take communion before a planned procession to strew flowers on Sebastião's grave and hold a memorial service. Many had posters and flags rolled up inside their clothes. Most were students and young people. As they walked, others joined them from huts and from offices. Two to three thousand-strong, the crowd moved briskly to Santa Cruz just a mile distant. After the Gomes family had entered the cemetery, the other marchers swarmed around the gate waiting to file in.

Few saw the army truck pull up to block the end of the cemetery street, nor heard the column of 200 fully-armed troops move up the road from the town and turn into the cemetery entrance. Only when they had taken up firing positions and trained their US-supplied M16 automatic rifles on the assembled mourners did panic take hold. Some tried to move away. But the high walls of

the cemetery and the narrow encircling streets hemmed them in. Sirens wailed and a sustained volley of automatic fire poured into the crowd—thousands of rounds cutting a swathe of death as people fought desperately to get through the cemetery gate. As a second volley rang out, the soldiers deployed in ordered ranks to surround the cemetery and move in amongst the tombstones to search out the wounded, and the survivors. Kicked and belaboured with rifle butts and riot sticks, each person was hauled away to be flung into an army truck, the wounded, dead and dying alike piled together in promiscuous confusion.

Outside the cemetery, many had dived for cover as the shooting started. The Indonesians advanced telling all the wounded to stand up. Many of those who did so were cut down with throwing knives. Meanwhile, 10 trucks of the dead and dying were dumped at Wira Husada No. 4 Military Hospital in Dili. Few of the wounded survived long: some were crushed under the wheels of vehicles in the hospital compound, others stoned to death or forced to swallow paraformaldehyde pills, a lethal disinfectant normally used to kill insects. They died slowly and in agony from internal bleeding and heart attacks. Then, in the early hours of 13 November, all the electricity was switched off in Dili and, under cover of darkness, the bodies were removed, trucked out of the city and dumped in mass graves (already prepared before the aborted Portuguese visit). On 15 November, three days after the massacre, about 80 Timorese, who had been captured after the massacre, were blindfolded, bundled onto army trucks and taken to Bé-Musi, a well-known execution site on the western outskirts of Dili, where they were shot by firing squad.[59]

In all, it is estimated by the Lisbon-based Ecumenical Association, *A Paz é Possivel em Timor Leste* (Peace is Possible in East Timor), based on careful analysis of information collected in East Timor between November 1991 and February 1992, that 271 were killed, 250 missing, and 382 wounded. Many of the injured avoided going to hospitals for fear of being arrested, tortured or killed, preferring instead to be treated by relatives or in the Church-run *colégios*, where they were looked after by nuns. Collective and individual massacres continued for many days after 12 November, the last known killing being that of a 13-year-old boy, Gil Vieira Amaral, in Baucau, over 100 kilometres from Dili, on 24 November. Amongst the 250 missing, were 24 members of a single family who lived in the Fatu Hada neighbourhood of Dili.[60]

Massacres on this scale were not unusual in the context of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. Yet, this time it was different. There were Western journalists present, two of whom (the Britons Max Stahl and Steve Cox) actually filmed the events in the cemetery.[61] It was impossible, given this visual evidence, for the Indonesian authorities to deny that killings had taken place or that the Indonesian army had been involved. But they sought to downplay this by referring to the massacre as a 'regrettable incident' (*musibah*)—shades of the Chinese version of Tiananmen (June 1989)—and only admitting to a fraction of the number of casualties estimated by Timorese and Western observers.[62]

The authorities in Jakarta clearly felt that the international reaction to the massacre would be short lived. Indonesia was such an important economic prize and its relations with Western governments so good, that the hue and cry

in the West seemed somehow irrelevant. The initial response from regional governments appeared to confirm this. Canberra soon signalled that the business of dividing up East Timor's oil wealth would continue as normal when, on 18 December 1991, barely a month after Santa Cruz, it signed a new agreement with Indonesia regulating their 'Joint Authority' in the Timor Gap.[63] It also did its best to prevent pictures of the massacre reaching the West by ordering its immigration officials in Darwin to search the belongings of Max Stahl and Steve Cox when they flew out through Northern Australia in late November.[64]

Not all Western governments, however, displayed such callousness: Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands suspended their aid programmes to Indonesia, and the US Congress struck Jakarta out of the US$2·4m International Military Education and Training (IMET) facility, a move reinforced in June 1994 when Congress barred Indonesia from buying IMET training out of its own funds and imposed a temporary prohibition on the sale of US small arms.[65] This had much to do with the end of the Cold War. Times had changed. Repressive 'security states' like Indonesia could now no longer rely on unquestioning Western support. The fight against Communism had been 'won'. In this context, a free East Timor was no longer equated with a Southeast Asian 'Cuba'. Access to natural resources, especially oil, and local markets were now much more important.

At the same time, the West's new-found concern for human rights, made it increasingly difficult for Jakarta to finesse the East Timor issue in international forums. The publicity surrounding the massacre, and the glaring discrepancy between the light 8–18 month sentences passed by an Indonesian military court on 10 military personnel involved in the shootings, and the harsh punishments (a life sentence in one case) imposed on 21 East Timorese 'ring leaders' of the demonstrations in Dili (28 October), Santa Cruz (12 November) and Jakarta (19 November), all raised questions about the legitimacy of Indonesia's occupation.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE SANTA CRUZ

Whereas in the mid-1980s, East Timor had slipped off the agenda of the UN Human Rights Commission, the Santa Cruz events placed it back centre stage. More searching investigations now began to be undertaken into Indonesia's human rights record, and the Kenyan Attorney-General, Amos Wako, dispatched as a personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General to Indonesia and East Timor in early February 1992 to make a report on the massacre (this was never published but, according to private UN sources, its findings were 'horrific').[66] A year later (10 March 1993), Jakarta suffered an important defeat in the Commission, when a resolution, sponsored by Denmark, expressed its 'deep concern' at reports of continuing human rights abuses in the territory and urged Jakarta to invite four special UN rapporteurs and working groups (an unprecedented number) to Dili to investigate the situation, and report on the 12 November massacre.[67] The decision by the new Clinton Administration

(in office, January 1993–present) to back the resolution, was critical to its success and signalled a toughening of Washington's stance on East Timor. The dramatic sit-in by 29 East Timorese youths in the US Embassy compound at the time of the November 1994 Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum in Jakarta further enhanced public awareness of the East Timor issue around the world.

When, eventually, in December 1994, the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Bacre Waly N'Diaye of Senegal, was released, it amounted to a devastating attack on the Indonesian government, calling for an entirely new investigation into Santa Cruz and making many other recommendations for the improvement of the human rights situation in Timor.[68] This went before the Human Rights Commission in February 1995 and, although intense lobbying by Indonesia and its allies prevented the adoption of another critical resolution, Jakarta was forced to accept the visit (3–7 December 1995) of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso. He recommended the permanent posting of a UN representative in Dili to monitor the human rights situation and greater access for Western human rights organisations such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International (in the event Jakarta only agreed to the presence of its own National Commission for Human Rights, a body set up following the September 1993 UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna with an eye to deflecting Western Criticism in the aftermath of Santa Cruz, the UN only being allowed to establish a human rights section in its office in Jakarta).[69]

While these initiatives were taking place in the Commission, talks between Indonesia and Portugal, mandated by the UN General Assembly in 1982, but broken off shortly before Santa Cruz, were resumed. So far eight sessions have taken place under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the most recent in Geneva in late June 1996.[70] Although the core issues of sovereignty and self-determination have yet to be addressed, there has been progress on bringing a broader spectrum of Timorese leaders, both pro- and anti-integrationist, into the 'consultation process'. So far, two of these meetings have taken place under UN auspices in Burg Schlaining in Austria (3–6 June 1995 and 19–22 March 1996). Although both produced consensus statements or 'declarations', only the first was substantive. This spoke of the need to take measures on human rights and the preservation of the cultural identity of the people of East Timor (including the teaching of Tetun and Portuguese), and, most important, stressed its support for UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982, which requested the UN Secretary-General to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned 'with a view to [. . .] achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem' and asked the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation to continue to monitor the situation in East Timor, recognising Portugal as the continuing 'administering power'.[71] This last reference was not appreciated by the Indonesians, who used their influence with their East Timorese delegates to make sure that the March 1996 dialogue was much less conclusive. At the same time, Suharto rejected the offer made by the new Portuguese Prime Minister, António Guterres, at the EU–Asia Summit in Bangkok (March 1996) in which limited diplomatic relations

were to be restored between Lisbon and Jakarta in return for the freeing of Xanana Gusmão and the guarantee of human rights in East Timor itself.[72]

The process of the intra-Timorese talks, however, marks a critical development in the UN-sponsored peace process. International pressure, however, will continue to be vital. Despite British reluctance (dictated partly by the need to secure the release of four Britons held hostage by separatist rebels in Irian Jaya) the EU has recently adopted a 'Common Position on the Situation in East Timor'(27 June 1996), the first article of which speaks of 'the achievement by dialogue of a fair, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor, which fully respects the interests and legitimate aspirations of the Timorese people, in accordance with international law [ie self-determination]'.[73] With Ireland now holding the EU Presidency (July–December 1996) and publicly pledged to a resolution of the East Timor question (Dublin has long been Portugal's strongest backer within the EU on this issue), greater energy will undoubtedly be devoted to the problem.[74]

The American position is even more important. While there is a significant concern about East Timor in Congress, the future fate of Indonesia itself now lies heavy on the agenda with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee due to hold hearings on Indonesia in late September, and moves afoot to halt the sale of nine Lockheed F-16 jets to the Indonesian Air Force in the light of the crackdown on the democratic opposition in Jakarta in late July. The Clinton Administration is hoping for a bloodless transfer of power, with Secretary of State Warren Christopher stating publicly that Washington favours a political transition in Indonesia that reflects the political pressure for democracy.[75] Since this domestic pressure within Indonesia itself draws some of its inspiration from East Timor's own struggle for national self-determination, the fate of the former Portuguese colony is now inextricably linked with the destiny of the democratic movement in Indonesia itself. The Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and the head of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) mass Islamic organisation, Abdurrachman Wahid, are both central figures here. Both draw support from Indonesian human rights organisations active in East Timor, and Wahid, in particular, is known to favour a political settlement which would allow the territory a large measure of autonomy. The stumbling block still remains the army and the ageing President Suharto. Neither has a permanent veto, and the latter's hold on power is weakening. At a time of regime change in Indonesia itself, with threats to public order growing, it is questionable whether the rather small Indonesian army (less than 200,000 reliable combat troops) can afford to maintain such a significant military presence (17,000+) in distant Timor.[76]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST TIMOR (1995–96)

At the time of writing (August 1996), reports coming back from Timor indicate that the situation remains tense. On 10 June, at least three deaths and 165 arrests were reported in Baucau when Indonesian police opened fire on a crowd of Timorese youths protesting at the defacement of a picture of the Virgin Mary by Muslim Indonesians.[77] This incident is but the latest in a long line of

insults against the Catholic religion, many of them provoked by the Indonesian security forces.[78] These have enabled Jakarta to portray East Timor's problems as essentially ethnic and religious in character (hence an infringement of the state ideology, *pancasila*) rather than a symptom of its own brutal occupation. At the same time, they have given Jakarta an excuse to criticise the role of both the East Timorese Catholic Church and of Bishop Belo, whose Nobel Peace Prize candidacy is seen as a threat.[79]

Jakarta has also targeted the Clandestine Front and youths suspected of supporting it (the November 1994 APEC demonstraton having particularly angered President Suharto). In June 1995, they succeeded in arresting the Front Secretary, Pedro Nunes, known as Sabalae and his assistant, Remigio Levi da Costa Tilman, both of whom are thought to have been tortured to death.[80] So intense has been the surveillance in East Timor itself (with many youths being forced to sleep in different places every night to avoid arrest) that, in 1995–96 alone over 100 young Timorese have sought political asylum by entering Western embassies after making the difficult journey to Jakarta (most have subsequently left Indonesia for exile in Portugal) and others have attempted to leave East Timor by boat: 18 reached Australia in late May 1995, while 27 others were arrested at sea in November and detained on charges of pro-independence sympathies. Many had been on the run since Santa Cruz and had suffered torture.[81]

While pressure has been mounting on the East Timorese youth, ethnic clashes between East Timorese and Indonesian migrants (especially Bugis from South Sulawesi) have become increasingly ugly. Serious incidents have occurred in Baucau (1 January, 20 July 1995) and in Dili (9 September 1995) which have resulted in deaths and the burning of local markets. In the latter incident, the market singled out for attack had been originally built by the Portuguese for East Timorese traders, but had been entirely taken over by Bugis merchants, the Timorese being relegated to the local car-park.[82]

Such incidents highlight the issue of population transfers and settlement in East Timor from Indonesia, fuelling fears on the Timorese side that Jakarta's long-term policy is to so alter the ethnic balance in Timor, with the influx of thousands of Indonesian migrants, that it will soon be able to hold a referendum in the territory which will return a result favourable to its interests (namely, continued integration). International pressure on Indonesia to halt any further population transfers is clearly vital in ensuring that talks on East Timor's political future can take place in a less ethnically-charged atmosphere.

CONCLUSIONS

The resolution of the East Timor conflict will require statesmanship of a high order and the courage to take unpalatable decisions. Both the Timorese Church, in the person of Bishop Belo, and the CNRM have put forward proposals for a settlement which are generous to Indonesia, the first allowing a 'special status' for East Timor, involving autonomy within Indonesia which would begin in the cultural and religious sphere, and then extend to the political and economic realms, resulting in a relationship rather like that of Puerto Rico to the United

States, or Madeira and the Azores to Portugal; the second calling for an immediate ceasefire and the release of all political prisoners, followed, within two years, by the reduction of Indonesian troop levels (from the current 17,000+) to 1,000 and the governance of the territory through a locally elected provincial assembly with Jakarta retaining sovereignty and control of foreign policy, with a properly supervised referendum (with independence as one option) to be held either five or 10 years later (the time-scale being decided in Jakarta).[83]

Some of these ideas (eg troop reductions and promotion of East Timorese to positions of administrative responsibility) were raised recently by Senator Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island) during a visit to Indonesia and East Timor in late May and early June 1996.[84] But, so far, Suharto has refused to countenance any change in East Timor's status.[85] A return to the pre-Santa Cruz era, however, is impossible. The 12 November massacre was a watershed as deep in the modern history of East Timor, as Amritsar (1919) and Sharpeville (1960) were in the history of the British Raj in India and White rule in South Africa. Many years may have to elapse before its full implications become clear, but there can be no longer any pretence that Indonesian-style 'development' is the panacea for all East Timor's problems, or that the fundamental issues of sovereignty and self-determination can be ignored. Jakarta may choose to stick its head in the sand, but the longer it does this the more serious will be the problems which it will store up for itself in terms of the future integrity of its island republic. That integrity has both a political and a moral dimension: politically, Jakarta will have to consider whether its unitary constitution and centralised form of government, bequeathed to it by the Dutch colonial state and the Japanese military occupation (1941–45), are the best recipe for success in a far-flung archipelago where the needs of resource-rich outer islands are often in conflict with the resource-deficient (but highly populated) Javanese centre; morally, because, at its heart, the national project begun in Indonesia in the early 20th century, was grounded in a moral vision of the future. As one of the founders of that project put it, the true exercise of political freedom requires the development of strong moral and spiritual qualities. Without them, independence (*merdeka*) would be pointless. At a time of turbulent events in Indonesia itself, when the very future of the republic is at stake, this is something which both Indonesians and East Timorese would do well to ponder as they prepare for a new relationship in the 21st century.

NOTES

[1] James Dunn, *Timor, A People Betrayed* (Milton [Queensland]: Jacaranda Press 1983), 41.

[2] *Ibid.* 143.

[3] *Ibid.* 359; John Taylor, *The Indonesian Occupation of East Timor, 1974–1989. A Chronology* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1990), 13.

[4] Ali Alatas, 'East Timor: De-Bunking the Myths Around a Process of Decolonisation', Remarks to the Members of the National Press Club, Washington DC, 20 February 1992 (*Indonesian News,* Information Department, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, London, Vol. 20 No. 28, 20 March 1992), 4–6.

[5] James Dunn, *Timor. The Balibo Incident in Perspective* (London: Parliamentary Human Rights Group, 16 October 1995), Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Christopher Bellamy and Matthew Brace, 'Indonesian Officer Linked to Murder of Britons in East Timor Trained in UK', *Independent on Sunday,* 5 November 1995; 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite', *Indonesia,* 55 (April 1993), 1995 n. 21

[6] Dunn, *A People Betrayed,* 293, 359.

[7] *Ibid.* 285–286.

[8] George Aditjondro, *East Timor. An Indonesian Intellectual Speaks Out.* Eds. Herb Feith, Emma Baulch and Pat Walsh (Canberra: Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 1994), 12–13, 23 n. 8.

[9] Dunn, *A People Betrayed,* 302; Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Loei Liong, *The War Against East Timor* (London: Zed Books, 1984), 233–37; 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite', *Indonesia,* 55 (April 1993), 189 n. 12.

[10] Lauri Hannikainen, 'The Case of East Timor from the Perspective of Jus Cogens', in Pedro Pinto Leite (ed.), *International Law and the Question of East Timor* (London: CIIR/IPJET, 1995), p. 110.

[11] Dunn, *A People Betrayed,* 358–360.

[12] Daniel P. Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (Boston; Little Brown and Company, 1978), 247.

[13] Dunn, *A People Betrayed,* 309.

[14] Artur Marcos, 'Tópicos Para um Quadro Lingúistico Dialectal de Timor Leste', Appendix 'Sobre a Expressão "Mau Bere" '; in *Timor Timorense, com suas Línguas, Literaturas, Lusofonia . . .* (Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 1995), 120–122; Taylor, *Forgotten War,* 42; Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *War Against East Timor* 59–60.

[15] Dunn, *A People Betrayed,* 307; Taylor, Forgotten War, 82; and for a full translation of Taylor's interview with Fr do Rego, see S.E. Asia Record, Vol. 1, No. 30 (1979).

[16] Robert Archer, 'The Catholic Church in East Timor', in Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (eds.), *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation* (London: Cassell, 1995) [henceforth: Archer, 'Catholic Church'], 121.

[17] Peter Carey, 'Introduction', in Carey and Carter Bentley (eds.), *East Timor at the Crossroads,* 2–3, 12; B.R.O'G. Anderson, 'Imagining "East Timor" ' Arena Magazine (April–May 1993), 27.

[18] See Carlos Lopes, 'Vaticano Divide Timor ao Meio', *Público,* 20 December 1995 (which gives the figure of 700,000 Catholics which would seem to be too high since the majority of Indonesian migrants are Muslim or Protestant). The total population of Timor is taken from *Tapol Bulletin,* 131 (October 1995), 20, quoting Mauro di Nicola, *Uniya* (Spring 1995) (who estimates number of Indonesian migrants at 180,000). For a rather more modest estimate (814,000) of the East Timor population in 1995, see UN General Assembly, 'East Timor', Working Paper prepared by the Special Committee on Decolonisation, 17 June 1996 (A/AC. 109/2049), 2, para 1 [henceforth: UNGA, 'East Timor']. On the Church's role, see further Peter Carey, 'The Catholic Church, Religious Revival and the Nationalist Movement in East Timor, 1975–95', in Bernhard Dahm and Naimah Talib (eds.), *Religious Revival in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, forthcoming).

[19] Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *War Against East Timor,* 27–36.

[20] Aditjondro, East Timor, 1, 22 n. 2.

[21] José Ramos Horta, *Funu. The Unfinished Saga of East Timor* (Trenton, New Jersey: Red Sea Press, 1987), 160–161.

[22] Taylor, *Forgotten War,* 84–85.

[23] Norman Lewis, *An Empire of the East: Travels in Indonesia* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), 122; Dunn, *A People Betrayed,* 336.

[24] Paulino Gama (Mauk Muruk), 'The War in the Hills, 1975–85: A Fretilin Commander Remembers', in Carey and Carter Bentley (eds.), *East Timor at the Crossroads,* 100–101; Michele Turner, *Telling. East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942–1992* (Kensington, NSW: New South Wales University Press, 1992), 115–116.

[25] Turner, *Telling,* 178–179; Lewis, *Empire of the East,* 136; Gabriel Defert, *Timor Est. Le Génocide Oublié. Droit d'un Peuple et Raisons d'États* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992), 174.

[26] Cristiano Costa, 'Timorese Refugee on Indonesian Operations in East Timor since 1975', *Tapol Bulletin,* 88 (August 1988), 20; Paulino Gama (Mauk Muruk), 'A Fretilin Commander Pemembers', 103; Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *War Against East Timor,* 39–41; Dunn, *A People Betrayed,* 318.

[27] Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *War Against East Timor,* 33–36; Defert, *Génocide Oublié,* 107–109.

[28] Lewis, *Empire of the East*, 111–113.

[29] Robert Domm, 'Timor Rebels Fight on with "Unshakeable Morale" ' *The Age* (Melbourne), 25 October 1990 (full transcript of interview in Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ABC Radio National, 'Official Transcript Background Briefing—28, 29, 30 October 1990: Report from the Mountains of East Timor: Interview with Resistance Guerrilla Commander, Shanana (*sic*) Gusmão').

[30] Dunn, *A People Betrayed*, 329–330; Defert, *Génocide Oublié* 116–122.

[31] Cristiano Costa, 'Timorese Refugee on Indonesian Operations', *Tapol Bulletin*, 87 (June 1988), 10; Defert, *Génocide Oublié*, 193–194.

[32] Aditjondro, *East Timor*, 17–20; Defert, *Génocide Oublié*, 181–182.

[33] Defert, *Génocide Oublié*, 147–150; Dunn, *A People Betrayed*, 320–323; Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *War Against East Timor*, 49–51.

[34] Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *War Against East Timor*, 67.

[35] *Ibid.*, 69, 82.

[36] Xanana Gusmão, *Timor Leste. Um Povo, Uma Pátria* (Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 1994), 95–97; João Mariano de Sousa Saldalna, *Ekonomi Politik Pembangunan Timor Timur* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1994), 321–324; Aditjondro, 'East Timor', 27–28.

[37] Saldanha, *Ekonomi Politik*, 322; Gusmão, *Timor Leste*, 97–104, 111–115.

[38] UNGA, 'East Timor', 2, para. 4.

[39] Domm, 'Timor Rebels', *The Age*, 25 October 1990 (full transcript in ABC Radio National, 'Report from the Mountains of East Timor').

[40] UNGA, 'East Timor', 2, para. 4.

[41] Archer, 'Catholic Church', 125.

[42] *Ibid.*, on Belo, see also, Paul Raffaele, 'Hero for a Forgotten People', *Reader's Digest* (March 1996), 29–34; and John Pilger, 'Bishop Belo Accuses the West', *New Statesman & Society* (15 July 1994), 16–17.

[43] Pilger, 'Belo', 16.

[44] Aditjondro, 'East Timor', 28, 42 n. 13.

[45] Lewis, *Empire of the East*, 118.

[46] Marcos, 'O Futuro da Língua Portuguesa em Timor Leste', in *Timor Timorense*, 127–140; Luís Filipe F.R. Thomaz, 'A Língua Portuguesa em Timor', in *Congresso sobre a Situação Actual da Língua Portuguesa na Mundo Lisboa—1983*, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1985), 313–338; and, on the inauguration of Portuguese-language broadcasts to Asia, see *Diário de Notícias*, 28 November 1995.

[47] International Platform of Jurists for East Timor (IPJET), *IPJET Newsletter* (Leiden), No. 6 (October 1995), 'The East Timor Case before the International Court of Justice' (esp. 'Comments by Dr. Iain Scobbie', 30 June 1995).

[48] Saldanha, *Ekonomi Politik*, 179–181; and (on war expenditure in East Timor in mid-1980s), see Taylor, *Chronology*, 60 No. 449.

[49] UNGA, 'East Timor', 3 para. 9, reporting an incident in Ermera, the coffee growing capital of East Timor, on 23 July 1995, where farmers burnt houses and shops, in protest against low coffee prices (they wanted the floor price doubled to US$1·25 per kg.).

[50] Saldanha, *Ekonomi Politik*, 175, 177, 324.

[51] Saldanha, *Ekonomi Politik*, 242–253, 279–284.

[52] Saldanha, *Ekonomi Politik*, 262–284 (esp. 265–273).

[53] Steve Cox, *Generations of Resistance: East Timor* (London: Cassell, 1995), 46.

[54] Aditjondro, *East Timor*, 39.

[55] Aditjondro, *East Timor*, 17–18, 26, 41 n. 2.

[56] Mubyarto *et al.*, *East Timor: The Impact of Integration. An Indonesian Socio-Anthropological Study* (ed. Pat Walsh) (report originally prepared for Gadjah Mada University [Yogyakarta], Research Centre for Village and Regional Development. Published in English by Indonesian Resources and Information Program [IRIP], Northcote [Australia], December 1991), 55.

[57] *Ibid.*, 58.

[58] Donaciano Gomes, 'The East Timor Intifada: Testimony of a Student Activist', in Carey and Carter Bentley (eds.), *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 106–108.

[59] Amnesty International, *East Timor; Who is to Blame? Statement Before the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation—July 1994* (London: AI, 13 July 1994), 13–15 and Max Stahl, 'Indonesians Fed "Death Pills" to Wounded', *Sunday Times*, 13 February 1994, 17.

[60] A Paz é Possivel em Timor Leste, *East Timor: The Santa Cruz Massacre/Timor Oriental: Massacre de Santa Cruz* (Lisbon: A Paz é Possivel em Timor Leste, February 1992), 3. See also Amnesty International, *East Timor: Who is to Blame?*, 13.

[61] Max Stahl's video footage of the massacre appeared in Peter Gordon's, 'In Cold Blood: The Massacre of East Timor', Yorkshire TV, 7 January 1992 (see also his personal account in *The Independent on Sunday*, 17 November 1991); Steve Cox's photographs have been published in *Generations of Resistance: East Timor* (London: Cassell, 1995).

[62] 'Advance Report of the National Commission of Enquiry into 12 November 1991 Incident in Dili-East Timor', *Indonesian News* (London), Vol. 20 No. 23 (1 January 1992); A Paz é Possivel, *Santa Cruz Massacre, 2.*

[63] Saldanha, *Ekonomi Politik,* 308.

[64] Cox, *Generations*, 52.

[65] Irene Wu, 'House vs. White House', *Far Eastern Economic Review* (30 June 1994), 18 (see also US Congress, 'Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1995', 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, *House of Representatives Report* [23 May 1994], 103–125).

[66] A Paz é Possivel, *Santa Cruz Massacre,* 8.

[67] UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 49th Session, Agenda Item 12, 'Situation in East Timor', E/CN.4/1993/L.81/Rev.1, 10 March 1993. See also, *Timor Link*, 26 (June 1993), 5.

[68] UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 51st Session, Agenda Item 12, 'Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Addendum: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, on his Mission to Indonesia and East Timor from 3 to 13 July 1994', E/CN.4/1995/61/Add. 1, 1 November 1994. See also, *Timor Link,* 32 (March 1995), 5–6.

[69] UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 52nd Session, Agenda Items 3 and 21, 'Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on His Visit to Indonesia and East Timor, 3–7 December 1995', E/CN.4/1995/112, 14 March 1996. See also *Timor Link*, 35 (March 1996), 4.

[70] UNGA, 'East Timor', 12 para. 57.

[71] *Timor Link*, 33 (June 1995), 1–2.

[72] *Timor Link*, 35 (March 1996), 2; and on the Portuguese Prime Minister's offer, see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 March 1996, 17.

[73] EU Council, 'Common Position of the Council of the European Union [. . .] concerning East Timor', 6554/96, Brussels, 18 April 1996 (adopted 27 June 1996).

[74] 'Irlanda Garante Apoio a Portugal na Causa Timor-Leste', *Diario Económico* (Lisbon), 22 February 1996.

[75] *Sunday Times* (London), 4 August 1996.

[76] According to Col. Mahidin Simbolon, the East Timor military commander, there are currently 15,403 troops in East Timor, including (paramilitary) police, see Claiborne Pell, *Democracy: An Emerging Asian Value: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,* 104th Congress, 2nd Session, June 1996 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 11 and Appendix, 'Military Situation'. These do not appear to include substantial numbers of special forces/commandos (*Nanggala/Kopassus*), under direct command of Suharto's son-in-law, Major-General Prabowo Djojohadikusumo, see Pell, *Democracy*, 19.

[77] Pell, *Democracy,* 10.

[78] UNGA, 'East Timor', 4 para. 19, 5 para. 23; see also, Carey, 'Catholic Church', forthcoming.

[79] *Ibid.*; and *Tapol Bulletin,* 131 (October 1995), 20–22 ('The Threat of Wider Religious Conflict').

[80] UNGA, 'East Timor', 3 para. 6; British Coalition for East Timor, Newsletter, June 1996.

[81] UNGA, 'East Timor', 7 para. 37.

[82] 'Riots Erupt as East Timorese Turn on Migrant Traders', *Guardian* (London), 2 January 1996; UNGA, 'East Timor', 5 para. 23; *Timor Link,* 34 (November 1995), 1–2.

[83] Pat Walsh, 'Towards a Just Peace', in Carey and Carter Bentley (eds.), *East Timor at the Crossroads,* 153–154.

[84] Pell, *Democracy,* 11–12.

[85] 'Presiden: Tika Akan ada Referendum di Timor Timur', *Kompas,* 29 November 1995.

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Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor* (London: Zed Books, 1984) [particularly useful on Fretilin and the nature of the guerrilla war in the early 1980s].

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Cox, Steve and Peter Carey, *Generations of Resistance: East Timor* (London: Cassell, 1995) [stunning photographs of East Timor under Indonesian occupation, including full colour pictures of the Santa Cruz massacre. Set in context by an informative 45-page introduction covering developments from the Portuguese era to the mid-1990s. Useful for beginners].

Dunn, James, *Timor. A People Betrayed* (Milton, Queensland: The Jacaranda Press, 1983) [the most comprehensive study of the political and diplomatic background to the Indonesian invasion and the first period of East Timorese nationalist struggle, 1975–early 1980s].

Jolliffe, Jill, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1978) [the best book on the period 1974–76, especially the four-month Fretilin interregnum, September–December 1975, by a journalist who was there].

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